Free and collaborative inquiry is at the heart of science. Academic freedom allows researchers to explore and share ideas without interference, while the freedom to choose collaborators fosters diverse and innovative partnerships. Mobility enables scientists to work across borders and disciplines, facilitating the exchange of ideas and access to resources.

Nonetheless, the conduct of science, particularly in disciplines with potential military or dual-use applications, has often been shaped by international regulations and treaties. During the Cold War, a complex system of regulations and controls imposed restrictions on the transfer of information as well as physical goods in fields such as electronics and computing and the historian John Krige has explored how these frameworks influence the global scientific landscape, highlighting the tension between the open exchange of knowledge and national security concerns. Treaties governing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, impose restrictions on research and collaboration to prevent the development and spread of harmful technologies. In the 1990s, the biosciences faced restrictions around so-called Dual Use Research of Concern.

Today, there is a growing recognition that international research collaborations face challenges from those who seek to illegitimately acquire academic research and expertise or interfere with academic discourse.  This has implications for researchers in STEM subjects, dual-use technologies, emerging technologies and commercially sensitive research areas, from AI and data science to mathematics and materials science. There is a concern that, without attention and effective management, such risks may impact the reputation of universities, academic integrity and research partnerships. In response, European universities, research funders and governments are increasingly thinking about how to strike the right balance between openness and research security in their international research collaborations.

To scope this emerging topic, and with seed-corn funding from the MIOIR, we organised a workshop in June 2024 to examine UK-China research collaboration and the impact of research security measures. The workshop was attended by government policy makers, academics and think tank researchers. We also organised a track at EUSPRI 2024 on technological sovereignty and international research collaboration. A follow-up track will be held in 2025 focusing on open science and research security.

Our research to date has identified several important points.

There is a diversity of responses between research systems. Countries are at very different stages in their response to research security challenges. Some countries, universities and public research institutes have developed detailed policies and processes and are at the implementation stage. Some countries are developing policies and processes, but these are yet to be implemented. Some countries have barely started down the road of addressing research security.

There is also diversity of responses within research systems. Universities and public research institutes are adopting research security policies and practices at different rates. Some have been proactive (even ahead of government), they have strong senior leadership direction, resourcing of substantial capacity, well developed processes for due diligence, risk management and risk mitigation as well as significant efforts to ensure awareness of research staff. Some have been reactive, only responding after suffering reputational damage due to highly publicised incidents – e.g. inappropriate research collaborations with organisations or researchers engaged in the military-scientific complex of a potentially hostile foreign country.

In addition, researchers’ awareness of research security issues varies dramatically within and between institutions and disciplines. Some recognise their responsibilities and the importance of regulatory compliance. Others see it as a bureaucratic burden. At the same time, the field is only now emerging as a professional service with a lack of capacity and skills in universities and research funding organisations.

There are many open questions, and we hope to explore some of these in our conference track at EUSPRI in June 2025.

– How can European policymakers balance the principles of open science with the need to protect sensitive research and technologies?

– What are the key security risks associated with open access to research data in fields such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing?

– What ethical considerations arise from restricting access to certain research outputs in the name of security, and how can these be addressed?

– How do existing European Union frameworks, such as Horizon Europe, address the dual priorities of promoting open science and safeguarding research security?

– Can there be a “middle path” where research is open to some degree but selectively restricted for areas that pose significant security risks? What might that framework look like?

– What lessons can be learned from analysing earlier waves of research security concerns, such as the Cold War?

Authors are invited to submit an abstract by 31 January 2025 to our EUSPRI track Topic 08: As Open as Possible, as Closed as Necessary – Negotiating the Relationship between Open Science and Research Security in European Science and Technology Policy. Call for Papers – EU-SPRI 2025

About the authors:

Andrew James is Professor of Innovation Management & Policy and a member of the Manchester Institute of Innovation and Research. His research and teaching interests focus on corporate technology strategy, innovation management and science and technology policy. He has engaged in research, consultancy and executive education with companies from a diverse range of sectors including chemicals, industrial electronics, pharmaceuticals and legal services but his particular focus is on the industrial and technological dynamics of the defence, security and aerospace sectors.

Kieron Flanagan is Professor of Science and Technology Policy and a member of the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research. His research explores science, technology, and innovation policy, with a focus on multi-level policy dynamics, regional and demand-side innovation policies, and the international dimensions of science and technology. He has published extensively on topics such as public procurement of innovation, research infrastructures, and UK science policy.

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